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Concept acquisition and concept mastery are key elements in learning. They are presupposed in the possession of both propositional and practical knowledge and are thus implicated in a very wide range of learning and teaching activities. Two of the most significant challenges facing educators concern the application and growth of knowledge after periods of formal instruction. These challenges are particularly significant, although by no means confined to professional and vocational education. I will argue that the mastery as opposed to the possession of concepts in professional/vocational education is dependent to a large extent on the concept possessor being able to deploy those concepts in authentic professional situations. It is important, therefore, that we understand the relationships between concept acquisition, concept possession and concept mastery. Know-how as well as know-that involves concept possession and mastery and the relationship between conceptual abilities and know-how will be outlined.  

Attention will be paid, for the purpose of exemplification, to one of the dominant modes of vocational/professional education as it is practised in Northern Europe. This mode is known as the dual system of apprenticeship and the continuing professional development that builds on it. It involves extended, controlled and monitored professional practice in operational conditions together with instruction and reflection in an academic environment which both provide the conceptual and theoretical underpinning of the relevant occupation and the opportunity for deepening conceptual understanding in practical conditions. The apprentice is typically a junior employee, the majority of whose time is spent both learning and working in the workplace. Theoretical, technical, civic and liberal instruction take place at least one day a week in an academic environment and it is intended that the conceptual background acquired in the academic environment is both consolidated in the workplace and reflects back on the more theoretical parts of the programme, whose typical length is three years (see Hanf 2007, 2011). Its aim is to prepare individuals to become highly competent workers and at the same time to prepare them for further professional growth to the level of expert in their profession or Beruf. The Dual System and its follow-on will serve as an exemplar of how concept possession can be turned into concept mastery within professional contexts. It is argued, however, that the account has wider educational relevance, as in the example of science education given in the section on Enacting an Account.

I shall approach the issue in the first instance by contrasting animal and human know how and then by distinguishing between concept acquisition, concept possession and concept mastery, showing the role that education, both formal and informal, play in developing each. 

Animals know how to do many things. But only in an extended sense can they be said to possess concepts, namely when we employ our own concepts in describing their actions: ‘that stalking cat is very effective in concealing its approach to the sparrow’. Our description of what the cat is doing reaches beyond any understanding that the cat possesses of what it is doing. Third person attributions of know-how to animals, making use of concepts necessary to our giving a full account, for our purposes, of their ability, do not imply a parallel conceptual understanding by the animal, although they do not imply a complete discontinuity between animal and human abilities, for example cats recognise instances of the species sparrow, under an aspect of interest to them, for example as prey (Crary 2012).​[1]​ When however we attribute know-how to other people, we do usually expect them to understand what they are doing. We may be mistaken in thinking that they are thinking that they are exercising ability A in order to do X to bring about Y, but we expect their understanding of what they are doing to take such a form, even if not with precisely the same content we attribute to them. Ability to do something does therefore involve some understanding of what that ability is, in what action it is being exercised and for what purpose. Even though our abilities often outrun our abilities to describe their exercise, this does not invalidate the general point that know-how involves possession, or as Bengson and Moffett 2007, p.33 put it, ‘reasonably mastery’ of the relevant concepts.

This broad use of ‘concept possession’ as ability exercised in judgement (Geach 1957), and hence in action (which can involve imputations of either explicit or implicit judgement) further allows an account of concept mastery as enhanced know-how in the employment of concepts, itself necessary to account for expertise. The possession of advanced conceptual abilities (concept mastery) beyond concept possession is part of what it is to be an expert. Concept mastery includes: enhanced recognitional abilities in relation to instantiations of the concept (Tye 2009, p.69), possession of an enhanced associated set of beliefs about the concept (ibid.), the ability to understand the detail of a concept (the subcategories), the fine-grainedness of its connections to other concepts. Last but not least, the detailed instantiation of subcategorical concepts in activity, are all elements of concept mastery.​[2]​ These points are followed up with discussion of examples in the sections on Background: intellectualism, Know How and  Conceptual Ability and Activity Concepts below. Concept mastery can come in degrees and may focus on different aspects of the original concept.

However expertise is often more than just mastery of the relevant concepts. No account of know-how can be adequate if it fails to do justice to what Ryle (1949) called the use of ‘intelligence epithets’ to describe and evaluate the way in which know-how is exercised (Winch 2010b).

The article goes on to provide a critique of the claim that only knowing-that involves conceptual ability (Luntley 2011, p.29) and the claim (Bengson and Moffett op.cit.) that know-how is to be fully explained as reasonable mastery of the concepts relevant to an action. Luntley operates with an unnecessarily restricted conception of know-how, in terms of brute behaviour.

“Of course, clinical skills involve all sorts of know-how, e.g. knowing how to administer 4-layered pressure bandaging. These are the Rylean behavioural skills, the raw know-how that causally explains performance.” (op.cit.p.29).

According to Bengson and Moffett, know-how involves understanding of what is involved in an action, rather than ability to perform that action (op.cit. p.34). The article will argue that such understanding not only involves concept possession and hence relevant know-how (to make judgements), but also that it is a necessary component of know-how in the sense of ability to carry out actions employing those judgements.​[3]​ Concept mastery, on the other hand, is a matter of degree and underlies most forms of expertise. However, expertise in the use of concepts relevant to an action does not entail that expertise in that type of action involves nothing more than expertise with the relevant concepts. Consequences of this view for vocational and professional education are explored, in particular the ideas of activity concepts and non-conceptual attention (Luntley, 2011).

Background: intellectualism, know how and  conceptual ability.

I notice that a bearing in the transmission is overheating and decide to shut off power to prevent damage to the vehicle, which I then do. This sequence of attention, decision and action involves the ability to make use, in judgement and action, of concepts such as bearing, overheating and damage. But this formulation of what has occurred could itself be misleading. What are these concepts and how do I use them? If they are objective entities how can I access them, let alone employ them in a sequence of actions? Is it not less mysterious to say that I exercise abilities in acts of judgement, in attending and in acting, which are part of the sequence just described? In this sense then concepts are abilities exercised in acts of judgement and related acts and are identified, both linguistically and through their analogous extension in nonverbal judgment, as well as in related actions such as noticing the readings of instrumentation, applying brakes and shutting off power, which themselves involve conceptual understanding and conceptually grounded abilities. (Geach 1957, Glock 2009). Although conceptual ability is an individual accomplishment, it depends on a socially grounded ability to use language. The relevant abilities are also objective. We can judge whether or not individuals possess the same concept by their actions and their responses. As Geach points out, the ability to swim is possessed by many individuals, but is the same ability, as evidenced by the fact that we can recognise different instances of it across many different people. Concept possession, as an ability exercised in judgement is objective in the same sense.





A substantial objection to Geach’s thesis might be that it faces a dilemma. The possession of concepts is said to be a kind of ability. If it is itself non-conceptual then  his account is self-contradictory -  how could an ability exercised in judgement not be conceptual if we have described concept possession in terms of abilities exercised in judgement? If, on the other hand such abilities are conceptual then we are owed an explanation of what such conceptual abilities consist in and it seems as if we have explained nothing by such an account. 

We need, in short, an account of how concept acquisition (and subsequently possession) get going, without resort to invoking the abilities we are seeking to explain.

Human know-how entails both physiological and neurological capacities​[4]​ (these cannot be described as conceptual capacities) that allow the development of preconceptual abilities associated with selective attention, discrimination, remembering and reaction. These allow for a certain uniformity in action and reaction, crucial for training and other kinds of learning, such as imitation, retention and improvisation, to take place. Such preconceptual abilities enable us to discriminate, remember, adapt etc. Without them, human learning would not get started. Not least among them is the ability to acquire speech. This is the foundation of language learning and concept acquisition, and progress from prelinguistic ability to a substantial degree of concept possession is descriptively well-understood (Tizard and Hughes 1984; Menyuk (1988), Halliday (1975), Crary 2012).

It is therefore impossible to explain the acquisition and possession of abilities exercised in judgement except as preconceptual abilities which, in turn, make possible language use and conceptual ability. But this is not to succumb to circularity of explanation. It is evident that an acquired ability must be underpinned by a capacity to acquire it. Such capacities make it possible to develop an elemental or preconceptual know-how involving the ability to discriminate between different features of the world, to attend to matters of salience and to react and respond to background features of our natural and social environment (Moyal Sharrock op.cit. Ch.3). These agreements in judgment and our ability to make them are part of human natural history and a condition for the acquisition of our full epistemic and conceptual powers. The apparently paradoxical and circular feature of concept acquisition produces much of the pressure to claim that concepts are innate (cf. Fodor 2008). But acknowledgement  that there are types of learning other than hypothesis testing (which requires possession of the relevant concepts in order to form relevant hypotheses) partly serves to dispel the impulse leading to this claim. Our abilities to respond to training, instruction, imitation, memorisation and practice rest on innate capacities which are preconditions of making the transition from preconceptual abilities to learn, respond etc. to those that can properly be called conceptual.​[5]​ But these abilities have to be acquired in appropriate conditions.
  
Acquisition, possession, mastery of concepts.

As the above suggests, know-how, expressed in judgement and action, cannot be understood except through conceptual abilities. We have looked at objections to the claim that concepts are abilities exercised in acts of judgement. We need to spell out in more detail what this claim involves. It might be objected that know-how cannot be conceptual because if it were it would be a form of knowing-that (Luntley, 2012 op.cit. pp.22-23). This objection is not compelling. Know-how is not, in everyday usage, a philosophically loaded term and does not carry connotations of non-conceptuality. Among the many actions that we are able to perform, most presuppose the exercise of conceptual abilities. Ryle’s examples are far from narrow behavioural knacks; the practice of medicine, courtroom perspicacity, map-reading, cooking and fishing are examples (Ryle 1949). All these, even at a basic level, presuppose the exercise of conceptual abilities.

One might still claim that although conceptual ability is apparently a feature of know-how, to think so is a mistake. On this view, the conceptual aspects of action can be assigned the label, ‘knowing that’ and what remains can be characterised as ‘behavioural skill’ or some such (see for example, Carr 1981; Tsai, 2011). But this move assumes what it seeks to argue for. There is no default assumption that our uses of the term ‘know-how’ and its cognates are non-conceptual. To assume that they are is to beg some of the most important and interesting questions about know-how and its relationship to knowing that.  Much know-how is underpinned by propositional knowledge, both of specific contextual facts and by systematic disciplinary knowledge providing the rationale for technical know-how. German vocational education regulations, for example, explicitly distinguish between between the first and second order practical abilities required (Fertigkeiten and Fähigkeiten respectively), the contingent knowledge (Kenntnisse) and systematic knowledge (Wissen) that provide a rational basis, not just a legitimation for action (cf. Luntley 2012).​[6]​  Thus much know-how incorporates such knowledge in judgements that are themselves a component of the know-how. Furthermore, many aspects of the environment are concept dependent. An educator, for example, needs to grasp such concepts as learning, teaching, pupil and assessment, in order to be able to teach. It would be wrong to say that such conceptual grasp was not a component of the ability to teach.

The Causal Picture: An Intellectual Act Leads To Action.

To agree that know-how is non-conceptual we would need to explain how the possession of concepts is often necessary for action. How is it that concept possession and the judgements that issue from it result in bodily movements that are realisations of those judgements? It looks as if events taking place in one medium (conceptual) are then realised in a non-conceptual one (the physical world). This view threatens to revive the problems of Cartesian philosophy of mind that Ryle tried to dispel. Even if the conceptual world is ‘physicalised’ through an identification of mind with brain, the question still remains how a representational system of concepts can result in non-representational physical movement.

In any case, the attempt to make the distinction between a realm of judgement (knowing that) and a realm of action (know-how conceived of as behavioural skills or knacks) does not work once it is realised that the use of concepts is itself an ability exercised in judgement and hence a form of know-how, namely the ability to use concepts in acts of judgement. A person’s manifestation of knowledge that something is the case usually involves the person’s use of concepts. Acts of judgement, although they are the basis of attributions of a disposition to judge, are not themselves dispositions. Such abilities involve for example, putting together arguments, but this is itself a conceptually-based ability. Since concept possession can only be discerned through concept exercise, concept possession is best understood as the possession of certain abilities which are instantiated episodically in acts involving know-how.

Concept  mastery and expertise. 

One of Ryle’s greatest insights about know-how was the realisation that what he called intelligence epithets could be applied to attributions of know-how. We can evaluate actions according to various criteria: moral, aesthetic, technical etc. and have a large vocabulary for doing so. Someone may dance gracefully, diagnose a problem efficiently, judge humanely, control diligently and so on. We cannot ascribe intelligence epithets to single propositions in the way that we can to single actions, although as White (1982) pointed out, one can to bodies of knowledge. Someone can know the history of the Napoleonic Wars thoroughly or have fluent mastery of quantum mechanics. But these attributions of subject mastery are attributions of know-how, involving abilities to use propositional knowledge to make inferences, both material and formal, to replicate and test theories and to discover new facts within disciplinary boundaries (WINCH 2010 a,b).

Any account of know-how involving an explanation of concept exercise as an integral part needs then to explain the role that concept possession plays in the development of expertise, that is, in the transition in ability from novice to expert, whatever that amounts to in a particular area of endeavour. We need to distinguish between concept possession and various degrees of concept mastery. The claim that concept possession involves linguistic abilities is a useful starting point. This needs significant qualification. The relevant linguistic abilities do not spring fully formed at birth but, as noted, are themselves developed over time. Furthermore, they are not to be understood as developing in isolation but as acquired as part of a system of related concepts whose relationships are grasped through the mastery of the relevant forms of material inference which demonstrate grasp of a conceptual subsystem (cf. Brandom 2000).  Even when some mastery has been acquired, it is premature to assume that full linguistic, let alone active mastery of a concept has also been acquired. Language mastery does not include merely the phonological, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic norms that allow the speaker to be understood but should also be understood as the ability to communicate effectively, very often in expert and specialist contexts where the conceptual field originally acquired is modified and made more dense and nuanced through participation in highly complex and specialised activities.

Growing expertise in action also involves growing specialised abilities in fine discrimination and awareness (not to mention, in many cases, more detailed grasp of a systematic body of knowledge) and hence to some extent a more fine-grained way of describing properties and relations, events and processes. This can involve the use of a specialised discursive element in which further subconceptual distinctions of terminology and material inference applicable to specialised forms of activity are exercised. Adequate possession of the concept of a motor vehicle need not, for example, entail use of or even acquaintance with types of vehicle suitable for travel in snowy environments or with armoured military vehicles. Indeed, one can argue that possession of the concept of a motor vehicle does not, of itself entail the ability to drive one, although the ability to do so invariably entails a greater mastery of the concept on the part of someone who can compared with someone who cannot, through, for example, acquaintance with relevant activity concepts associated with driving (see next section and Luntley 2012 in particular). It should also be noted that concept mastery in terms of depth and detail, may enhance the practical ability, as in the example of shutting of an overheating engine in the section entitled Background: intellectualism, know how and  conceptual ability above.





The ability to act almost invariably outruns our ability to describe what we can do. Thus, even though we may be able to supplement accounts of what we do with more fine-grained ones, there will come a point where that is no longer possible. Thus even though growing expertise is associated with growing concept mastery it is almost always possible to reach a point at which the specific nature of what is done lies beyond our ability to give an adequate account of what is involved, beyond the use of ostension and a phrase of the form ‘like this’ (Luntley, op.cit.). Even here, it may be doubted whether such ostensions do away with the ineffable character of the know-how as it does not follow from the ostensibility of the action that a particular content (a way of doing something) is transferable to another potential agent (for a defence of the idea that it is, see Gascoigne and Thornton 2013).  As Hutchinson and Read (2011) point out, we are not thereby gesturing at some form of in principle inarticulable propositional knowledge. Rather we are showing that our abilities often outrun our ability to describe them. Thus Polanyi’s phrase ‘We know more than we can tell’ (Polanyi 1966, p.4) is not misleading if it just means this, but is if it implies that we have propositional knowledge in principle beyond our conscious grasp.

Such examples as wheel-rim planing (Sturt 1923), playing a musical instrument (Polanyi op.cit.), performing a quintuple salchow (Bengson and Moffett op.cit.) and bandaging (Luntley op.cit.) all involve non-discursive know-how whose discursive limits are reached where ostensive demonstration takes over. They are all done ‘like this’ accompanied by a demonstration. Luntley argues that ‘like this’ in the appropriate context is an activity concept and that ‘It is done like this’ expresses a genuine proposition. It is important to realise however that an activity concept of the kind described is embedded in a conceptual field in which the ostension makes sense, and as such is a particular and often specialised manifestation of an item in a broader conceptual field such as wound-dressing, figure skating, music playing or vehicle building and repair, which gives the activity concept its application. Bandaging ‘like this’ only makes sense as a form of wound-dressing. As Wittgenstein pointed out, ostensive definition only makes sense against an already understood conceptual field. Fine-grained demonstrations of know-how do then demonstrate concept possession (if one can see and have some understanding of how the task is done) and mastery (if one carries out the task ‘like this’) but the activity concepts acquired and exercised exist within an already-existing conceptual field which is usually genuinely discursive.

One interpretation of this kind of expertise needs to be avoided. Since the employment of activity concepts in action involves conceptual understanding, judgements like ‘You do it like this’, even when enacted, do not express propositional knowledge rather than know-how. There is no problem if this is understood as a judgement by an observer, or by an agent commentating on what he is doing. However the exercise of the concept in an action is not the assertion of a proposition accompanied by a piece of behaviour. Rather, it is the manifestation of know-how which is implicitly the exercise of an activity concept. 
What is someone doing when they are learning to tie a bandage ‘like this’? It is most likely that they will be paying attention to what they are doing and will under normal circumstances recognise the conceptual field in which they are operating. Attention to the act will involve the use of hand and eye, but will, above all, involve being serious and aiming for success. To be serious means to exclude trying to do other things simultaneously and trying to be successful, which will usually be more than a threshold level of fulfilment, particularly if one is more than a novice. It means treating what one is doing with respect, as something worthwhile doing. This is manifested in the way in which one works (carefully, neatly, thoroughly, showing respect for the materials etc.) and context is important in attributing such properties to the act.  The fact that I am demonstrating a form of bandaging in a training session is a strong signal that I am paying attention to what I am doing as the price of failure is significant.

Paying attention does not of itself involve conscious thought. That may be helpful in an activity carried out attentively, and causally efficacious in securing successful performance, but may also be a distraction, particularly if it involves the idle play of thoughts rather than close involvement with the task. Paying attention is a variegated phenomenon with related families of criteria for ascribing it, depending on context and activity.​[8]​ It may involve focus on particular subtasks, such as holding the bandage firmly with one hand, and may involve soliloquistic activity such as rehearsing precepts to oneself, such as ‘remember to tighten after the first winding’. Much the same point applies to the often-cited task of riding a bicycle. Intuitive understandings of balance, distance, speed, not to mention proprioceptive sensibility seem to be dominant. An experienced cyclist does indeed cycle automatically, but the novice, paying attention to his cycling, may well exercise precepts soliloquistically such as ‘keep your eyes on the road’, ‘keep pedalling steadily’, ‘lean into this curve’, ‘remember to brake on the slope’ etc. One might be tempted then to think of attention as a conceptual activity by focussing the analysis on these putative soliloquistic accompaniments, which may in certain circumstances, be helpful in successfully carrying out a task. Thus paying attention begins to look like acts of what Ryle called the ‘avowal’ of propositions. 

But to think of attention as an activity, even as an accompanying activity, is mistaken. Attending to what one is doing is almost always doing it in a certain kind of way, usually with seriousness, respect for the activity and the people and materials  involved, and a concern for success or even excellence in outcome. It is only ‘non-conceptual’ in the somewhat misleading sense that it does not necessarily involve the avowal of propositions. But since the activity being carried out and the ability exercised involve conceptual understanding and hence concept possession, it is misleading to call attention that involves activities that are conceptually constituted (they exist because we have incorporated them into our conceptual scheme) non-conceptual. Little of what we do involves soliloquistic accompaniment pertinent to the activity, but most involves prior conceptual understanding of what we are doing. In this respect our paying attention is different from that of a cat stalking a bird, to use another of Wittgenstein’s examples (of the natural expression of intention), because normally we understand what we are doing, how it is linked to other activities, what the criteria of success are and what the consequences of our actions might be. In many cases we can explain this, with the proviso that some aspects of our abilities outrun our ability to describe them.

Concept Mastery, Know-How and Expertise.

I have argued for the following positions:

1.	Know-how involves concept possession and in many cases expertise involves some form of concept mastery over and above what is required for concept possession. (see examples of wound-dressing and driving above).
2.	Concept mastery often involves extra-linguistic manifestation of concept understanding, for example in action which presupposes detailed and nuanced  action within the relevant conceptual field.
3.	1. does not imply that know-how is a form of propositional knowledge, nor that ability expressed in action is non-conceptual. 
4.	abilities that outrun our ability to describe them are not necessarily non-conceptual and they often exist within, and are presupposed by, discursive conceptual fields.

It is now time to test these against counter-claims within the literature and to explore the practical implications of the position. These have, in turn, some bearing on the evaluation of the philosophical plausibility of the thesis.

One well-known example is that of Irina, an expert ice-skater. Irina can execute a quadruple salchow (four twists in the air from a jump before a smooth landing on the ice) but, like everyone else, cannot execute a quintuple salchow (five twists) (Bengson and Moffett, 2007). It is quite correct to maintain, as do Bengson and Moffett, that Irina has a reasonable conceptual mastery, both of what is involved in executing a quadruple and a quintuple salchow. Furthermore, according to the analysis developed in this paper, her mastery of these concepts involves much more than mere possession of the concept of a multiple salchow. Because she is an expert, she has an enhanced understanding of the techniques involved in performance and of the training and practice needed. Some of this may be communicable linguistically. She may also have some grasp of the systematic knowledge which explains how it is possible to carry out such manoeuvres, in terms of the psychological preparation necessary, the bodily exertion and the mechanics involved, which is integrated into her know-how.

Nevertheless, although Irina has a more than reasonable mastery of the concept of a quintuple salchow, she nevertheless does not know how to perform one in the relevant sense. The only way to deny this conclusion is to maintain something like the following:

1.	Irina knows how to and can perform a quadruple salchow.
2.	Irina has a reasonable conceptual mastery of both a quadruple and a quintuple salchow.
3.	Irina’s know-how consists in her reasonable conceptual mastery of the relevant action.
4.	Irina cannot perform a quintuple salchow.
5.	Irina knows how to perform a quintuple salchow (because 2.,3.).
Therefore it follows that:
6.	Irina knows how to perform a quintuple salchow but cannot perform one. (because 3, 4, 5).
7.	Therefore knowing how to F is not the same as being able to F (from 6, which is an instantiation of a universal principle).
and, furthermore,
8.	to know how to F is to  be acquainted with a way of F-ing, which involves reasonable mastery of the relevant concepts. 

We should note that the English expression ‘know-how’ is ambiguous between ‘…is able to…’ and ‘…is able to give an account of how to…’. Bengson and Moffett however (2007) produce arguments for the view that ‘to know how to...’ is not ambiguous, but can be fully explicated in terms of an individual’s acquaintance with ways of doing things.​[9]​ 

Know-how should not be identified with ability. As Snowdon (2003) has noted, there are numerous cases where someone’s know-how is no longer matched by the corresponding ability, through physical decay or accident, for example. Some abilities like breathing do not satisfy the criteria for know-how, because they are involuntary, do not rely on the practice of a technique and are not subject to normative appraisal.​[10]​ But we can still say that in normal circumstances, knowing how to do something involves being able to do it. Even the case where ‘A knows how to F’ is equivalent to ‘A can give an account of how to F’, an ability is involved, namely to give an account, itself a form of know-how. This suggests that this ‘can give an account’ sense of know-how is derivative of the sense of know-how as ‘can do’ and also that attempts to reduce know-how (can do) to know-how (can give an account of the exercise of the ability) such as that of White (1982) are circular, leaving unexplained the nature of the ability invoked. The difficulty is similar to that identified by Ryle (1946, 1949), that in avowing a proposition (or sequence of propositions) I am exercising an ability and so my knowledge is not merely the passive entertaining of a proposition.





One could maintain that Irina’s reasonable mastery of the concept of a quintuple salchow amounts to knowing how to perform one. ‘Like this, with one more twist’ would demonstrate reasonable conceptual mastery without exhibiting know-how, although very similar know-how would be demonstrated. One could expect that someone who had reasonable conceptual mastery of F would be able to give an account of how F was executed.  One could also say, in this example, that Irina has enactively given an account of what it is to execute a quintuple salchow. One might object that the distinction between knowing how to do something (in the ability sense) and knowing how to do something in an enactively giving an account sense is really a distinction without a difference. But this is mistaken. There is a real difference between Irina’s ability to provide enactment of a quadruple salchow plus explanation of a quintuple salchow and the actual ability to perform one. In one case a quintuple salchow results and in the other it does not. 

However there is an important point here, which perhaps is not fully captured through the use of an example of  a skill like the above.  We can perhaps distinguish the case where someone performs a quintuple salchow as a lucky break but is not able to repeat the performance. In those cases most of us will have no difficulty in maintaining that the agent does not know how to perform one, but rather that favourable circumstances allowed her, in this instance, to execute one. Are there cases where we see someone repeatedly enact a kind of activity yet are also prepared to withhold the attribution of know-how? This is difficult in the case of skill as repeated performance suggests mastery of the relevant technique. When the performance is repeated in a variety of circumstances we are also prepared to say that the skill is practised with discretion and judgement. However, if we look at more complex activities we may be more reluctant. 

Suppose a teacher wishes to teach pupils to test a scientific hypothesis through the design and execution of an experiment. In one sense getting pupils to do this should not be too difficult. The pupils have the ability to plan a sequence of activity, the skills to set up equipment, to read measurements and the ability to evaluate and write up the results, together with the ability to infer conclusions from the experimental data. It looks as if the pupils know how to test a hypothesis through experimentation. However, something important may be missing. The pupils may not know how to form a hypothesis – they have been given one by their teacher or they have selected one from a repertoire of established hypotheses in a textbook. Even if they have been guided to the formation of an original hypothesis by their teacher, what they are doing is far removed from the ability of an experimental scientist, contributing to scientific knowledge through experimentation. They are replicating experimental activity without actually forming and testing hypotheses in the sense in which an expert (or even a novice) scientist will do so. Such an ability already entails a vast knowledge and understanding of a systematic body of knowledge and practice in order to generate meaningful hypotheses. Conceptual understanding of a high order is required in order to form and test hypotheses experimentally. 

Nevertheless, the replicative experimental activity required to master this highly complex ability may be educationally necessary. Project management ability involves the carrying out and execution of a large number of related activities in sequence. These in turn require second-order activities such as planning or co-ordinating (Ryle 1979, Chapter 2) as well as skills such as setting up equipment and using measuring instruments. It is highly plausible to suggest that the development in someone of the ability to form and test hypotheses presupposes the ability to carry out various kinds of simulatory and replicative activities of increasing complexity before it can itself be successfully attempted. In this case the distinction between an ability to enact a complex activity and the ability (know-how) to actually carry it out really matters, even in cases where it is difficult to distinguish between the enactment and the genuine performance. 

It might be objected that this is an example of a third order piece of know-how (project management) and so not relevant to skills. The successful manager of a project such as the formation and testing of hypotheses will have to plan, co-ordinate, control, and communicate during the process and should be able to evaluate both process and results of the project. Activities such as planning and co-ordinating will require the exercise of specific skills, which may include constructing diagrams or flow charts (planning) or checking various processes and their timings (co-ordination). However, although the exercise of some skills will undoubtedly be necessary in order to plan or co-ordinate the experiment, the exercise of those skills by themselves will not be sufficient for an observer or assessor to attribute the ability to plan or co-ordinate to the pupil. In a nutshell, one can use planning skills without actually planning; drawing a diagram of an intended sequence of activity does not amount to planning the intended activity except in certain circumstances. 

There are a number of relevant factors. First, in some circumstances we are only prepared to attribute planning to the activity retrospectively when it has been executed with a certain degree of seriousness (Hasselberger 2014). Second, we expect from the agent a certain degree of attention before we are prepared to attribute the second order ability to them. We cannot do this by reading the agent’s mind and dialogue may be useful. Important is the agent’s behaviour in the surroundings in which it takes place. Here we will take into account such factors as focus on the task; a concern stated or implicit, for the success of the activity undertaken and attention to the detail of the planning by, for example, cross-checking and repeated testing and, possibly, modification in the planning sequence. The subtlety and complexity of the indicators of ability to carry out such second order activities correspondingly makes the task of distinguishing between enactment of an account and performance of the relevant activity more difficult to accurately gauge. The way in which one responds to the rapidly evolving exigencies of complex professional environments and adjusts intentions and practices in a dialectical relationship with such environments gives us, through cumulative observation, an evolving picture of how such second order ability is developed. For reasons already mentioned however, such attention is actually conceptual and involves refined perceptual abilities, as well as the deployment of the activity concepts already discussed.  Just as an activity concept can be ostensively defined, so also can a perceptual report of  a fine-grained distinction noted in a work situation. In neither case is the conceptual field of the workplace abandoned, but our ability to articulate distinctions bumps up against limitations of our language, although such limitations are not immutable. This has implications for vocational/professional education which will be dealt with in the next section.


Why concept mastery need not be exhaustive of accounts of the relevant area of expertise. Implications for professional/vocational education and training.

This section will draw out some of the practical implications for this analysis of the role of concept possession and mastery for VET and professional education more generally. It will stress the importance of understanding in developing competence and expertise. 

Understanding that know-how involves concept possession and mastery allows us to distinguish important dimensions of the transition from novicehood to expertise across a wide range of activities and points to a particular model of curricular and pedagogic practice. This model is broadly speaking the one adopted in the Germanic Dual System, whereby learning in the workplace is integrated and articulated with simulatory activity and classroom instruction.

As argued, nearly all kinds of know-how involve a degree of concept possession since when we attribute ability in something to someone we presuppose that they have some understanding of what they are doing. The fact that they cannot, in many cases, fully articulate that understanding does not invalidate this point. As noted, our ability to do something often outruns our ability to explain what we do, even though the ‘inarticulate’ element of our know-how presupposes and is located in a conceptual field. Luntley’s activity concepts, as well as what might be termed ‘activity percepts’, defined ostensively, are often the bearers of this detailed conceptual understanding and presuppose operation within a conceptual field.  

However, this is a general point about the acquisition of ability. What else does systematic vocational education add? It will be helpful to focus in the first instance on the development of skill, in most cases a necessary preliminary to the acquisition of more complex forms of know-how. It was noted how the ability to practise a skill involves an understanding (invariably incorporating some discursive element) of what is involved. Explaining to someone what it is that they are doing, why they are doing it and what standards of excellence in doing it involve, are part of the activity of the workplace, of the workshop and of the classroom, each involving different aspects of the development of such understanding. The contribution of the classroom environment in developing the systematic knowledge (Wissen) underlying the practice is very important in developing this conceptual understanding, but it is only through practise of the concepts through use of tools and materials in simulatory and subsequently in controlled operational conditions that this understanding becomes firmly grounded through embodiment in skills that, although exercised in workplace conditions, demand a thorough conceptual map of the activity field. Although the dual approach is not the only way of doing this, its tight articulation of theoretical and operational elements of learning enable this to occur rapidly and thoroughly (see Hanf 2007, 2011).   Furthermore, perception of what excellence in practice involves also needs exemplification (acquaintance) and aspiration through practice. 

However, the exercise of skill is usually more than the exercise of technique. It involves situationally appropriate judgement and discretion and attributes of character that allow the worker to practise in the operational conditions of the workplace where, for example, safety, weather, colleagues, material, financial and temporal constraints are all important. If the practice of a skill (rather than just a technique) requires operation in appropriate conditions, then a variety of work and work-like environments are necessary.

Next, to take second-order abilities such as planning and evaluation, there are, in the overwhelming majority of cases, procedures and skills known to be effective and therefore it is not satisfactory to leave their acquisition to chance. However, such abilities, although they may depend on skill, are not themselves skills. The analysis suggests that although instruction in procedures and practise in relevant skills may be pedagogically necessary, practice both in simulatory environments and in controlled conditions in the workplace is also required. Since these abilities are necessarily part of more complex and articulated wholes like projects, they are best acquired within a broader framework of project management (Winch 2013). The acquisition of this ability itself requires a graded articulation involving supervision and some of the replicatory practices described earlier before it can be fully articulated in controlled conditions. Once again, practice in controlled workplace conditions is necessary for the full development of project management ability. 

These second and third order abilities require conceptual mastery. One cannot manage a project without a considerable degree of understanding of what one is doing and where the various stages fit into the overall project as well as how it fits into larger spheres of human endeavour, thus requiring the breadth aspect of concept mastery (see section on Concept Mastery above). Planning, communication etc. themselves thus require conceptual mastery if they are to be undertaken with the requisite degree of seriousness and attention that make them something more than ‘going through the motions’ of planning or communicating. Concept mastery depends in the first instance on concept possession, the ability to make judgements of the appropriate kind at the most basic level, perhaps in terms of description of what is involved in certain kinds of activity. Mastery comes with growing facility in terms of explanation, correction, evaluation, exemplification, revision and other forms of second-order activity, which are best undertaken in workplace conditions. Such facility is likely to be associated with all five aspects of concept mastery described above.​[11]​ If we want to distinguish between replicative activity and genuine know-how, then the workplace is the best environment in which to do so.
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^1	  Davidson (1975), (1982) sets out a comprehensive position which imputes concept possession only to language users. I broadly agree with this, but part from Davidson in thinking, unlike him, that animals can have beliefs. The distinction between first and third person attributions pays a greater role in my thinking about these matters than it does in Davidson’s (see my 2015, forthcoming). Comment on Davidson’s thesis has been extensive. Carruthers (2008) stresses the absence of metacognitive ability in animal behaviour, while rejecting some of Davidson’s scepticism concerning animal conceptual powers,  Churchland (1980) is sceptical about explaining mental phenomena only in linguistic terms. Hurley (2003) is keen to emphasise the limited but nevertheless real proto-conceptual abilities of non-language users. Hyman (1999) argues for the knower’s ability to give reasons on the basis of awareness of facts as a condition for the possession of knowledge, without either disagreeing or agreeing with Davidson about the extent of non-human animals’ conceptual powers.
^2	  The third and fourth of these can be seen in the concept-possessor’s ability to make relevant material inferences (Brandom, 2000).
^3	  There is now a considerable literature on the nature of know-how. In this article I particularly discuss the non-propositional intellectualist position of Bengson and Moffett. The propositional intellectualism of Stanley and Williamson (Stanley and Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011)  also considers know-how to be a species of know-that. Their position is also that know-how involves concept possession in virtue of its being a species of know-that. Although it is beyond the scope of this article, their account stands in need of explanation of what knowing that p in a practical mode of presentation actually amounts to without covertly bringing back know-how within the explanation (see Hornsby 2011; Noe (2011) for further comment).
^4	  For the distinction between an ability and a capacity (an ability to acquire an ability) see Kenny (1968) pp.102-104.
^5	  See Luntley (2008) for a critique of this approach from the perspective of the ‘paradox of learning’  and WINCH (2015) for a response to these objections.
^6	  This analysis differs from that of Tsai (2011) in considering relevant propositional knowledge to be a contributory element in actions manifesting a type of know-how, rather than there being a hybrid kind of know-how that is, in part knowledge that, or even in some cases, a kind of knowledge that. Tsai’s analysis suggests that know-how is necessarily behavioural rather than conceptual.
^7	  A term introduced in Luntley (2012).
^8	  Philosophical Investigations, para.33.
^9	  These arguments are examined in WINCH (2010a), Chapter 2.
^10	  It is possible, though to control one’s breathing to some extent, for example singers and divers need to do this in different ways.
^11	  Baker and Hacker’s (1985) normative activities have this second order character. They presuppose a good conceptual understanding on the part of those who conduct them. Normative practices in the human sense require, not just the use of language and hence the use of concepts, but a form of conceptual mastery that entails the ability to reflect on concept possession within such activities as teaching, explanation and correction, pp.41-55.
^12	  This is not to imply that concept mastery cannot be guaranteed by other forms of professional education, like internship, only to suggest that there are good reasons for thinking that ‘dual’ approaches, where workplace and academic learning are closely linked, may be the most effective.
